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Summary 
 
 
Our objective has been to experiment with diverse economic indicators in order 
to help equip Ukrainian policymakers with a relatively simple tool, which could 
deliver warning signals about a possibility of upcoming economic problems and 
thereby assist the Government in designing policy instruments which would help 
prevent or soften a slowdown or recession. 
The project has undertaken the following tasks: 
• Based on an analysis of the pattern of growth of the Ukrainian economy 
since the end of the post-Soviet recession (the year 2000) we have formu-
lated the hypotheses concerning the factors preceding/affecting the up-
turns and downturns (with a focus on the latter) of the country’s growth; 
• We have studied international “best practice” in early warning indicators 
in order to design a similar system for Ukraine; 
• We have selected the relevant indicators, consistent with our hypotheses 
and used a probit model in order to experiment with these indicators; 
• The final set of indicators used in the model included the following lagged 
independent variables: changes in the value of export, changes in real ex-
change rate of the hryvnya, producers’ price index adjusted for domestic 
price inflation index and the IMF’s metal price index, bank credit interest 
rate, changes in the industrial output of the European Union; our depend-
ent variable (which was used as a proxy for the overall economic growth) 
was changes in real industrial output; 
• The model was used to formulate a warning forecast for the Ukrainian 
economy for the second half of 2008 based on the data for the January 
2000 – June 2008 period; all predictions for the second half of 2008 have 
delivered warning about a downturn of the Ukrainian economy; 
• We ran a few additional experiments with the model, and 
• We have recommended several further steps of analysis toward a full im-
plementation and institutionalization of such a model in the near future. 
COMPOSITE LEADING INDICATORS FOR UKRAINE…
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that struck Ukraine last summer was a surprise to many 
economic analysts who got used to a continuous growth during the last eight years. 
Similarly to the 1998 crisis, the downturn was sparked by external events affecting 
the global economy. Nevertheless it could be argued that in both cases, i.e., in 
1998 and 2008, the crises were predictable and their occurrence should not sur-
prise the analysts. What was difficult to predict was not the occurrence itself, but 
rather its timing and its depth. Today (in December 2008) we are not able to pre-
dict for how long this crisis will last and what effect on the long run Ukraine 
growth it will inflict. Such a prediction would require a thorough analysis and a 
complex econometric model. In Ukraine there are a number of research teams 
which develop and adroitly use these kinds of models and they are better equipped 
than our project to deal with these kinds of issues. However the chances for an 
accurate prediction are not very good. As have been documented in the literature, 
the econometric models are strong performers during relatively stable times but 
are not very good in predicting abrupt downward shifts due to some powerful ex-
ternal shocks (Klein and Burmeister, 1976). 
When we began formulating the concept of this project (in January 2008) we 
were convinced that Ukraine is heading toward a crisis similar to that in 1998. As 
in 1998, Ukraine had experienced a period of relatively stable exchange rate which 
was not compatible with high inflation rates. Growing foreign trade deficit and 
current account deficit were sending warning signals, along with other worrisome 
indicators, such as prices of imported fuels remaining solidly below world market 
levels and exceptionally high metal prices, suggesting that Ukraine macroeco-
nomic stability relied on shaky grounds. Ukraine was heading for yet another les-
son in macroeconomics that a poor coordination between the fiscal policy and the 
monetary policy (especially exchange rate policy) will result in a breakdown, 
sooner or later. At the same time Ukraine, unlike most other countries at an 
equivalent or higher level of economic development, lacked any explicit “early 
warning” system that would alert about an upcoming danger. Obviously such a 
system is by no means a panacea for economic troubles but nevertheless may pro-
vide useful information to policymakers. The current global slowdown would 
hardly spare any country, regardless of its analytic capabilities, institutional foun-
Janusz Szyrmer, Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Inna Golodniuk 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 85 10 
dations and macroeconomic policies, however a well established data and warning 
forecast system may help in abating the crisis and speed up the recovery. 
This project is not at a position to provide a powerful forecasting tool that 
could be used as a substitute to comprehensive econometric models. Instead our 
objective has been to experiment with diverse economic indicators in order to help 
equip Ukrainian policymakers with a relatively simple tool which only task would 
be to deliver warning signals about a possibility of upcoming problems and 
thereby assist the Government in designing policy instruments which would help 
prevent or soften a slowdown or recession. A byproduct of this effort becomes a 
thorough analysis of the relationships between economic growth and several mac-
roeconomic aggregates which could improve our understanding of the workings of 
the Ukrainian economy. 
Our tasks were as follows: 
1. Based on an analysis of the pattern of growth of Ukraine economy since 
the end of the post-Soviet recession (the year 2000) formulate hypothe-
ses concerning the factors preceding/affecting the upturns and downturns 
(with a focus on the latter) of the country’s growth; 
2. Study international “best practice” in early warning indicators in order to 
design a similar system for Ukraine; 
3. Select the relevant variables and appropriate method/model; 
4. Experiment with the model to search for the best model specification (se-
lection of relevant indicators); 
5. Apply the model to formulate a warning forecast for the Ukrainian econ-
omy for the second half of 2008 based on the data for the January 2000 – 
June 2008 period; 
6. Check model performance based on actual data available for July-
December 2008; 
7. Recommend further steps toward a full implementation and institution-
alization of such a model in the near future. 
Given our objectives, our model had to satisfy a number of criteria: 
• Degree of simplicity: A simple model is needed which could be easily 
updated, understood and used by non-experts (i.e., persons with an eco-
nomics background without proficiency in advanced statistics and 
econometrics); 
• Frequency of data: The variables used in the model must be monthly 
time series in order to enable short-term forecasts; data collected on a 
quarterly or annual basis would not be useful for the early warning pur-
pose; 
COMPOSITE LEADING INDICATORS FOR UKRAINE…
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• Categorical information: In its basic format, the model is not expected to 
provide highly accurate quantitative forecasts but instead be confined to 
categorical variables; at an initial stage this could be just a binary zero-
one variable sending a warning signal if a downturn is expected; 
• Forecast horizon: The model should estimate a medium term trend pat-
tern; the warning will be generated for each month during which a 
growth rate below the trend is predicted; thus a downturn is not an abso-
lute decline of the economy, but is defined relatively to the trend1; 
• Number of variables: The model should have a low number of predictors 
(independent variables) in order to secure the easiness of its applicabil-
ity, simplicity, and transparency; a user of the model should be able to 
trace the impact/contribution of each variable (monthly time series) on 
the dependent variable (a growth indicator such as GDP growth rate or 
industrial production growth rate); 
• Real time data: All variables used in the model should be real time data, 
i.e., data available at the moment of model application; the variables 
which are available with a greater delay (of several months) or which are 
subject to major corrections several months after their original publica-
tion should not be used in the model. 
Until the summer 2008 the Ukrainian economy was growing for the last eight 
years, although the pattern of this growth kept changing. Different activities—
employment, investment, production, consumption and foreign trade—expanded 
at different rates due to a combination of factors. Over time Ukraine has been suc-
cessful in introducing structural reforms and building an institutional infrastructure 
for its market economy, although this process has not finished yet. At this moment 
the Ukrainian economy can be classified as an advanced transition economy. It 
shares its features with other transition economies as well as with mature market 
economies.  
Any systemic research on and forecast for this economy is a difficult task for a 
number of reasons, in particular: 
• Rapid structural and institutional changes: It is difficult to discern a sta-
ble pattern, based on which longer-term relationships can be identified, 
policies evaluated and predictions made; 
                                                 
1 It is worthwhile to note that the determination of the trend is easy but by no means a 
straightforward task. There are several algorithms for trend determination and, depending 
on which of them is used, the trend, and therefore the predictions of downturns, may differ 
from one another.  
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• High volatility: The amplitude of short-term (month to month) shifts is 
very high. This is due to both real changes as well as, in some cases, it 
can be related to data quality problems; 
• High vulnerability: When measured in billions of dollars, Ukraine is still 
a relatively small economy which greatly depends on and is very sensi-
tive to external events, such as political conflicts, shifts in world market 
prices, shifts in the economic situation of European Union countries or 
Russia, etc. 
During the last quarter of century, a variety of models have been developed to 
explain and predict the direction of change as well as to provide “early warnings” 
in order to help both policymakers and investors in their decision making. As men-
tioned above, in Ukraine there are several forecast models but no operational early 
warning system has yet been designed and maintained for a longer period of time. 
In the economic literature two main kinds of cycles are identified: business cy-
cles and growth cycles. The latter may be treated as a special case of the former. 
The classical business cycles are composed of four stages: expansion, peak, reces-
sion, and trough. Growth cycles in turn, are defined as short-term fluctuations of 
growth rates around a long-term trend. The data seem to suggest that the business 
cycles tend to be asymmetric (i.e., their expansion periods are often longer than 
contraction periods) and take longer periods of time, while growth cycles tend to 
be relatively more symmetric with similar lengths of accelerating rate periods and 
decelerating rate periods, and tend to be shorter2 (see more discussion of cycles in 
Section 2). 
In the 2000-08 in Ukraine we witnessed clear growth cycles (Figure 1) occur-
ring with a quite impressive symmetry in both growth expansion periods and 
growth contraction periods, each one lasting for about 1.5 year. Each of the two 
Ukraine’s growth cycles lasted for about three years. Interestingly some analysts 
of trends in other transition economies are also indicating a three year pattern of 
growth cycles (e.g., Jagric, 2002, Jagric and Ovin, 2004). 
Well in accordance with the neoclassical growth model and other similar con-
cepts, a less developed economy is expected to grow faster than a highly devel-
oped market economy. While typically for the latter economy a decline in growth 
by a few percentage points may result in recession (negative growth), in a rapidly 
growing emerging market economy this decline may result in a slower, but still 
positive, growth rate. 
                                                 
2 An important difference between the two kinds of cycles is that the business cycles are 
expressed in standard growth rates (percent change in GDP, etc.), while the growth cycles 
are “detrended”, and the change rates are expressed in term of a medium-run trend—they 
are positive for the above-trend growth rates and negative for below-trend growth rates. 
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Figure 1. Ukraine, GDP and industrial output growth, monthly, Jan00-Apr08 
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Source: CASE-Ukraine database. 
 
In order to detect the factors responsible for business/growth cycles, numerous 
indicators/variables are designed and used. They are often classified into three 
categories: leading, concurrent, and lagging. This classification is always some-
what arbitrary and may be quite confusing. For example, a housing construction 
boom could be a concurrent indicator (simultaneous with a rapid growth of GDP), 
a lagging indicator (a catching up effect of a poor performance of this sector in the 
past), as well as a leading indicator resulting in both expansion (in short-term) and 
in recession (in a longer-term), typically due to “overshooting” of housing supply. 
Much caution is needed in using these kinds of indicators for economic forecasts. 
One can also identify different kinds of factors, depending on their sources, in 
particular: endogenous factors, exogenous factors and external factors. Endoge-
nous factors are the activities of investors, producers and consumers in a market 
economy, such as investment in fixed capital and/or inventories, supply of bank 
credits, household consumption and savings, etc., assumed to be outcomes of do-
mestic market forces. Exogenous factors are events occurring in a country outside 
of its economy, especially due to politics and policymaking, such as institutional 
reforms undertaken by the governments or simply current decision making in 
monetary, fiscal, trade, social and other policies. Finally external factors are 
shocks from abroad, e.g., shifts in world prices of important goods (fuels, metals, 
agricultural products, etc.). 
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The three kinds of factors may be further subdivided into generic and specific. 
The former are “standard” macroeconomic aggregates applicable, by and large, to 
many market economies, while the latter are particular factors applicable to a 
given country. 
Obviously in many cases it becomes difficult to clearly distinguish which kind 
of factor/indicator we are dealing with. Especially the exogenous and endogenous 
factors are tightly interconnected and we end up in simply assuming endogeneity 
or exogeneity of concrete variables used in a model. 
A main challenge in growth forecasting is the selection of right leading indica-
tors (LI), i.e., the variables, which possess a significant predicting power related to 
economic cycle shifts. Usually only a small number of LI are used for a number of 
reasons: 
• Convenience: The smaller number of indicators the lower the data re-
quirements are and the easier their processing and modeling; 
• Clarity: If a large number of indicators is used, it becomes difficult to 
sort out important relationships and understand what is going on in an 
economy; 
• Avoidance of redundancy; since many macroeconomic variables exhibit 
a herd behavior, being tightly interconnected and highly correlated with 
one another, well in accordance with the so-called Occam’s razor princi-
ple, only a few of the mutually weakly correlated or uncorrelated vari-
ables are used3. 
A frequent problem is shifts in relationships over time. Sometimes macroeco-
nomic variables behave in a “reverse” pattern, i.e., operate in a pattern inconsistent 
with a standard theory. While, in accordance with the so-called Phylipps theory, 
economic recessions (growing labor unemployment) tend to coincide with a de-
clining wage/price inflation or even deflation, we have also witnessed periods of 
“stagflation” (e.g., in the 1970s in many developed countries) when a recession 
(and high unemployment) was accompanied by a high inflation. 
Some variables tend to behave erratically and are not useful for making any 
predictions. On the other hand an apparent stability of some indicators in Ukraine, 
such as official unemployment, eliminates them from a collection of useful predic-
tors (see below for further discussion).  
The weakness of market institutions in Ukraine affects the relationships among 
standard predictors. E.g., transmission of monetary policies is weaker and takes 
more time in Ukraine than in more developed market economies. The stock market 
                                                 
3 Alternatively several correlated variables can be represented by their (linear) combina-
tion. This method however diminishes the clarity of forecasts.  
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contributes little to investment financing and its effects on the economy are not as 
strong as in the countries with highly developed capital markets4. 
Our hypotheses as to how the economy operates today and what variables 
should be used for short-term warning forecasts have to be based on concepts 
which could not be easily empirically tested with the existing time series data. Un-
der the Soviet system, the “horizontal” linkages between the economic variables 
(supply, demand, prices, exchange rates, interest rates, profitability, etc.) were 
weak and the economy was managed mostly by an ad-hoc “vertical” decision 
making (bureaucratic administration). During transition, stronger horizontal rela-
tionships have been established and endogenous economic factors have begun 
playing a much greater role than in the Soviet system. 
Emergence of market-driven interrelations is however a mixed blessing. On the 
one hand it helps in predicting impacts of changes in one variable upon some other 
variables, due to the strengthened market linkages, based on the existing theory 
supported by ample empirical experience. On the other hand, however, a tightly 
interlinked market economy encompasses a plethora of connections making un-
ambiguous conclusions difficult. E.g., growing imports may indicate both a dy-
namic growth of domestic demand and be a manifestation of economic expansion 
as well as a declining competitiveness of domestic products and indicate economic 
decline. Also time lags between an event (e.g., a currency real appreciation) and its 
effect (e.g., a high foreign trade deficit) are difficult to predict5. 
Because of these endogenous complexities, as well as many hard-to-predict ex-
ogenous and external shocks, a simple, and at the same time reliable, system for 
early warning forecasts is a challenging task. Importantly, one should try to over-
come a frequent weakness of many macroeconomic forecasting modeling and 
analysis efforts is their focus on mechanics of trend cycles rather than on an under-
lying socio-economic logic, based on which some explicit hypotheses are formu-
lated and tested. Many publications present advanced mathematical/econometric 
work but are somewhat superficial in identifying, descripting and explaining the 
interrelations between the variables, short-term and long-term causalities, and their 
institutional and structural fundamentals.  
The high complexity of economic cycles motivates establishments of systems 
of interacting composite leading indicators (CLI). More often than not it is not 
possible to predict effects of changes in one indicator without checking the shifts 
in some other indicators. 
                                                 
4 Ironically, a low level of development of financial and capital markets may help Ukraine 
and other emerging market economies reduce the negative effect of global financial crisis by 
making them less vulnerable to the current vagaries of the global equity and credit markets. 
5 In general, the weaker the market institutions (endogenous economic linkages) the longer 
it takes for the effects of exchange rate alterations to occur. 
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2. A brief overview of business 
cycles 
Empirical and theoretical literature on business cycles distinguishes the short-
term cycles (appr. 40 months, as defined by Kitchin, 1923)6, the mid-term cycles 
(usually 9-11 years), and the long-term cycles lasting for more than 15 years (e.g., 
Kondratieff waves of 50-60 years). Their theoretical explanations vary from exter-
nal factors of nature (e.g., the Sun cycle of 11 years) and fundamental characteris-
tics of the human nature (such as the Chinese 12-year “mid-term” cycle, and 60-
year “long-term” cycle) to the purely technical economic reasons (Zarnowitz, 
2007). The latter, in turn, are related to the systemic nature of an economy, which 
is penetrated with a dense net of positive and negative feedbacks. Due to the time 
lags, inertia, “frictions”, and various kinds of inflexibilities, these feedbacks work 
imperfectly, and this leads to cycling oscillations. The most important typical 
cases are: negative feedbacks with inertia or time lags that usually result in sinu-
soidal oscillations; and positive feedbacks with a “limit” (or “shedding”) that re-
sult in the relaxation of self-excited oscillations. At the next level of inquiry one 
can find that the above mentioned imperfectness of feedbacks is, in turn, caused 
among other things by the imperfect information (like erroneous expectations)7, so 
the availability of accurate leading indicators can help in smoothing of the cycles. 
The short-term (Kitchin) cycles are usually associated with accumulation and 
discharge of inventories. According to Metzler (1941), firms are trying to keep 
their inventories proportional to current sales. Under these circumstances, when 
the sales increase, production should increase in order to fill in the stocks and keep 
the above mentioned proportion. But according to the Keynesian theory, increas-
ing production follows an increasing demand, which further boosts the sales. This 
process tends to converge to a new and higher level of sales. However, any incre-
mental decrease from this level spurs the opposite trend driven by similar feed-
backs (multiplier effects). Due to inertia in the processes of stocking and de-
stocking of inventories, this process under certain parameters results in sinusoidal 
                                                 
6 Business Cycles and Depressions: An Encyclopedia. By David Glasner, Thomas F. Coo-
ley Contributor David Glasner Published by Taylor & Francis, 1997  
7 Among other reasons are institutional factors (like inflexible wages or prices), low liquid-
ity of investments into the fixed assets, effects of economies of scale, etc. 
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oscillations. Moreover, increasing inventories require borrowing money from the 
banks. A higher demand for the money results in higher interest rates, thereby 
making stocking of inventories more expensive for the firms. This effect further 
shrinks the multiplier, but again with a lag related to a delayed reaction of the fi-
nancial markets, and inertia in the firms’ internal routines for computing the nec-
essary amounts of stocks. 
The mid-term cycles are the best studied, and most often referred as “business 
cycles” in general. The variety of proposed theoretical models include excessive 
(and often inefficient) investments in the fixed assets, which are inflexible by their 
nature; discrepancies between aggregate supply and aggregate demand caused by 
inflexibility of prices and wages; inherent instability of an economy driven by a 
Keynesian multiplier, which leads to explosive growth that is unsustainable and 
has to face a “limit” or a non-linear “sealing” of some kind; and so on. 
The evidence for the existence of the longer cycles studied by Kuznets and 
Kondratieff is less convincing. Since the economy of independent Ukraine has 
existed for less than twenty years, these cycles are beyond the scope of this report. 
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3. Cycles in Ukraine 
Distinction between advanced market economies and the economy of Ukraine 
can be best understood within the framework put forward by North et al. (2005, 
2006, and 2007). According to their classification, Ukraine falls into the category 
of the “mature limited access order” (MLAO) states. This means that although 
non-state economic and civil organizations exist and sustain, they still need a pa-
tronage. Such an arrangement provides state officials with discretionary power that 
they use to (at least partially) control business entry, thereby limiting the competi-
tion and protecting the market power of their loyal clients. This way, a great deal 
of market power becomes an inherent feature of economic structure of the MLAO 
states8. But as long as those countries undergo a rapid transition (which is espe-
cially true for Ukraine), the degree of this market power is subject to complex and 
uneven evolution. These features have important implications for the nature of 
business cycles in the post-Soviet transition countries. 
First of all, the economies with high concentration of substantial market power 
demonstrate a different kind of macroeconomic behavior than the predominantly 
competitive ones. In a competitive market economy the windfall transitory quasi-
rents from arbitrage or innovations attract investments, so the rapid expansion of 
respective industries diminishes those quasi-rents. The main cause of possible 
problems can be overinvestment during the period of a boom. In a MLAO econ-
omy, the most important sources of rents are protected from exhaustion that can 
result from competition. So, they tend to persist for a long time. An overinvest-
ment due to uncoordinated actions of many independent investors that all are be-
ing attracted with the same lucrative opportunity is unlikely to happen, because 
such investors will not be allowed to enter the industry due to various formal and 
informal restrictions on the internal capital mobility. Besides, monopolized 
economies are less susceptible to usual kinds of price and demand shocks as con-
sidered in the literature, because monopoly rent in a short run can serve as a sort of 
“safety valve”. Furthermore, the same market power of buyers at the labor market 
allows the firms to conduct flexible wage policies9. Therefore, indicators charac-
                                                 
8 A high rate of market concentration in Ukraine was among the findings of the OECD 
country report of 2007. 
9 All of this means that the MLAO economies are also less sensitive to traditional counter-
cyclical policies prescribed by the Keynesian theory. In particular, the trade-off between 
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terizing the demand and external shocks should have less predicting power in the 
MLAO countries comparing to the advanced market economies. 
By the mid-2008 the mid-term business cycles in Ukraine were not observed. 
The long-term recession of 1990-1999 was attributed to the collapse of Soviet sys-
tem and hardships of further recovery. The longitude of decline, in turn, was 
caused by predominantly institutional problems. They had little in common with 
the factors that are believed causing recessions in the market economies. This is 
one of the reasons why we consider only the period starting from the year of 2000, 
and recommend extra caution in using the data for this year. 
It is also unlikely that a kind of classical recession could be observed in 
Ukraine in the near future. 
Firstly, Ukraine is a small open economy, with the exports/GDP ratio amount-
ing to 45% for the year of 2007. Thus, the world economy’s outlook, particularly 
the demand for major export commodities (steel, wheat, sunflower, and others) 
play at least not less important role than internal demand that drives “classical” 
business cycles. 
Secondly, the labor market is quite flexible and relatively open. During the reces-
sion of the 1990th the excess labor was absorbed by the informal sector or by foreign 
countries to which thousands of job seekers migrated. Given a high demand (until 
recently) for low-skilled labor in the neighboring countries of EU and in Russia, the 
unemployed Ukrainians in mass have been finding jobs abroad, and supporting their 
families with remittances. These remittances constitute a substantial part of house-
hold incomes (up to USD 21 billion by the estimations of the NBU specialists10). 
Thirdly, an important part of domestic demand – the investments – are largely 
driven by exogenous (predominantly political) and external factors (political, fi-
nancial, etc.) rather than the cyclical ones. The FDI that is playing an increasingly 
important role, depends on such exogenous and external factors as the prospects 
for EU accession, overall investment climate, privatization of the large and lucra-
tive fixed assets, and the situation at the world markets. The domestic investments 
depend on the necessity of replacement of depreciated fixed assets, access to and 
price of credits, and so forth. Both domestic and foreign investors are highly sensi-
tive to the protection of their property rights and contract enforcement. In particu-
lar, the so called “re-privatization” resulted in a dramatic decline of investments, 
despite the fact that it confined to a single case of Krivorizhstal’. 
                                                                                                                           
inflation and employment may provide an inadequate framework for economic policymak-
ing in such a country. When a recession occurs in an economy with a high concentration of 
market power, the monetary and fiscal expansion makes little effect, and instead can result 
in stagflation, as Olson (1982) suggests. 
10 http://www.newsru.ua/arch/finance/23oct2007/zarobitchane_print.html. 
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Finally, the potential of the Ukrainian economy for catching-up remains very 
high. Still unused business opportunities and possible productivity gains, as well 
as gains from trade, competition, and entrepreneurial potential are very large com-
paring to the mature market economies. Under these circumstances even marginal 
improvements in the development of market institutions provides a large economic 
payoff. Accordingly, any delay or step back in this process incurs a high price, and 
may even lead to a recession. However, these causes are contingent upon political 
developments rather than cyclical instability of the economy. Instead, the main 
risks to economic growth include fragilities and imbalances of various other kinds. 
We will consider the following candidates for CLIs. 
External factors. The Ukrainian economy is susceptible to terms-of-trade 
shocks due to, e.g., the fall of the world prices on major export commodities, first 
of all steel; or a large increase of gas prices charged by Russia. The latter factor is 
also politically contingent. Therefore, certain proxies for terms of trade are defi-
nitely needed regardless to their past prediction power. 
Financial/banking system. The banking system is still immature; a decade ago 
it was the weakest one in the region (share of domestic private sector liabilities to 
GDP was only 7.7% as of January 1998 and has increased eight times since then). 
Such a rapid growth is usually considered as a factor of high risk. Until recently 
the national currency was remarkably stable, while the trade balance became 
highly negative with little chance for improvement. It was partly offset by capital 
inflows which are, however, quite unstable. The remittances are susceptible to the 
EU and Russia’s policies towards Ukrainian labor migrants, many of which are 
employed in the informal sector. The most of banking credits are short-term, so 
their contribution to capital account is positive only as long as net domestic credit 
expands. The FDI contributions are sporadic by the nature. Last but not least, the 
state budget is still not balanced. While until recently the deficit was relatively 
low, it was run at the stage of a boom. Since the state liabilities are relatively in-
flexible, and taxation is by and large based on negotiations with the biggest tax-
payers, the fiscal risks are high and politically loaded. Meanwhile, the financial 
and banking crises almost inevitably result in declines in the growth rates, or even 
lead to recessions. For this reason, the respective proxies deserve to be included 
into the CLI, even though their prediction power in the past was modest. 
Natural and technical factors. Ukraine has got a large agrarian sector. Food 
processing constitutes a substantial part of the industrial sector. Therefore, a poor 
harvest can affect economic growth for a couple of percentage points. Besides, 
Ukraine’s infrastructure is predominantly obsolete and can become a source of 
technical disasters of unpredictable size. Some early warning indicators for both 
factors are worth consideration. 
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Unlike the mid-term cycles, the short-term cycles can be analyzed by our study, 
which covers the period of more than two Kitchin-type cycles. However, if they 
exist, their causes should be different from the ones described above. The dis-
cussed above Metzler model is hardly applicable to Ukraine, as well as to any kind 
of open economy, merely because of the very loose connection between domestic 
production, total sales, and domestic aggregate demand. The role of credit in de-
termination of amounts of inventories has increased during the last years, but it 
still can hardly be a major factor. Finally, the inventories play a less important role 
in the Ukrainian economy, than, for instance, in the USA. While in 2000 the U.S. 
inventories amounted to more than 150% of GDP, in Ukraine the respective ratio 
was only 45% in the same year; since then it decreased to 39% at the end of 2007. 
Instead, we argue that the short-term cycles in Ukraine can be caused predomi-
nantly by other factors. 
Firstly, the short-term cycles are observed in the advanced market economies, 
particularly in the EU (see Figure 1A in the Appendix), which is an important 
trade partner of Ukraine. Of course, due to the abovementioned strong impact of 
external factors, these cycles in the countries of destination for Ukrainian exports 
should bring about the cycling in Ukraine. 
Secondly, we hypothesize that cyclical behavior could be caused by inflexibil-
ity of prices, which under certain circumstances may result in cyclical oscillations 
of growth. Such inflexibility, in turn, is caused by institutional factors acting 
through their impact on the economic structure. Namely, slackness of the capital 
markets, and general internal closeness of equity markets impede the vertical inte-
gration. While formal and informal restrictions on business entry lead to a high 
concentration of market power, which in Ukraine is further supported by an inher-
ited high concentration of industries. Then, the price inflexibility and cyclical de-
velopments take place because complimentary industries with significant market 
power act like the Cournot’s complimentary monopolies. 
Cournot has showed that the uncoordinated complimentary monopolies fail to 
share total monopoly rent in an efficient way. Each of them tries to set its markup 
as high as possible, in order to capture a larger share of the total producer’s sur-
plus. Even when they finally reach the equilibrium, their cumulative price appears 
to be higher, and joint output lower, than the ones of a single vertically integrated 
monopoly. Therefore, a segmented economy, where the competition at the hori-
zontal level is limited, and possibilities to purchase vertical counterparts or merge 
with them is restricted, exhibits higher prices and lower total output than it would 
when being a competitive one. 
But if the demand instantly grows, it naturally results in higher prices, and in-
creasing monopoly rents. This leads to an even higher inefficiency, because mo-
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nopolies fail to share gains from such a growth smoothly. Every time when in-
creasing demand breaks the above-described inefficient equilibrium, they become 
engaged in a similar kind of competition for the share of total rent. But since each 
of them tries to set its markup as high as possible, they would permanently over-
shoot the equilibrium market price. At the macro level, the producers in mass will 
face declining growth in aggregate demand, so they halt price increases until the 
demand catches up. However, while retail sector receives the market signal of the 
price overshooting immediately, the producers react with a lag, which is higher for 
those at the beginning of a production chain. Lagged negative feedbacks usually 
result in cyclical oscillations around the main trend, as we can observe in the 
Ukrainian economy. 
Similar effect may take place even if the final product of such kinds of comple-
mentary monopolies is being sold at the competitive market, as in the case of ferrous 
metallurgy. We have witnessed numerous conflicts between producers of ore, coal, 
coke, and steel, as well as railways and ports that all strived for a larger share of ex-
tra profits brought about by increases in the world prices of steel. Such kinds of con-
flicts tend to impede output growth. Due to the effect of different time lags for vari-
ous stages in the production chains, such slowdowns are likely to be oscillating11. 
All of these effects may end up in cyclical oscillations around the growth trend. 
But they normally should not lead to recessions or economic crises. However, the 
suppressed competitive selection results in deteriorating economic efficiency. 
From time to time it would lead to the “clean-up” crises that screen out the least 
competitive firms, and generate fresh deliveries of the Shumpeterian “creative de-
struction”. Such kinds of crises are likely to be triggered by the exogenous (e.g., 
political) or external factors, and occur less often than the cyclical slowdowns of 
growth described above. Unlike the latter, the recession phase in the case of such a 
crisis should be abrupt and may be quite deep, while the recovery would have an 
exponential/sinusoid shape.  
Reallocation of market power and vertical integration may be another cause of 
accelerating or decelerating growth. Yet another source of such kind is changing 
bargaining power of the labor force (trade-unionism, or political developments), 
which can result in respective changes of business costs, on the one hand, and in 
demand, on the other hand. These kinds of effects are likely to be politically-
driven. Moreover, in Ukraine the dominating industries are capital-intensive and 
export-oriented. Their business costs are not significantly affected by wage in-
creases. They only marginally depend on domestic demand. However, such kinds 
of effects may become important in the future. 
                                                 
11 Systems of differential equations with time lag tend to have oscillating solutions of sinu-
soid shape. 
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4. Previous attempts of building a 
CLI index for Ukraine 
There are two main veins of constructing a CLI index for Ukraine: 
• Survey-based indicators (index of consumer expectations (ICPS), in-
dexes or separate indicators of business expectations (IER, NBU, and 
DerzhComStat); and 
• Indicators based on hard data (ICPS and IEF). 
The surveys are run on a regular basis, while at present, no hard-data based CLI 
is compiled. 
 
 
4.1 Survey-based indicators 
 
Box 1. IER: The Quick Enterprise Survey (QES) 
Starting from July 2002 the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consultations 
(IER) has been running a survey, which was originally launched in 1996. It covers 300 
enterprises, randomly chosen in Southern, Western, Eastern, and Central Ukraine. 
The survey belongs to the group of business tendency surveys and follows a method-
ology developed at the IFO institute in Munich, Germany. Such surveys are a meaningful 
supplement to standard economic statistics as they provide insights concerning percep-
tions and expectations of economic agents. In many countries, such information is widely 
used by economic analysts, policymakers and businessmen alike, in order to obtain a 
clearer picture of current performance and to forecast changes in the short- and medium-
term run. 
The main objective of the Survey is to indicate the influence of economic policy on 
business development through monitoring perceptions and expectations of managers re-
garding changes in general economic conditions (business-, regulatory- and lending cli-
mates), production (e.g., output performance, impediments to production and employ-
ment), and financial performance at the firm level (e.g., prices, profitability, and ar-
rears)12. 
                                                 
12 http://www.ier.kiev.ua/English/qes_eng.cgi. 
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The CEOs of firms are asked about their expectations and current changes during the 
face-to-face interviews. Then, all indices are calculated using the same methodology. For 
each positive answer a score of “+1” is applied; for each negative answer a score of “-1” 
is applied; and for each answer indicating no change a zero score is applied. The indus-
trial confidence indicator is defined as the arithmetic mean of the answers to the ques-
tions on production expectations, assessments of the order books, and assessment of the 
stock of finished products (the latter with an inverted sign) 13. 
 
In general, this methodology corresponds to the one of The Joint Harmonized 
EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys. However, it is not clear 
whether it yields good CLIs for Ukraine. Its prediction performance has been 
mixed. Currently the IER together with Swiss partners (CIRET) re-evaluates the 
methodology of calculating the index. A weakness of the QES is its small sample 
size, restricted to the manufacturing sector only. Moreover, the ferrous metallurgy 
industry and the large firms in general are underrepresented. This is unfortunate, 
since these sub-sectors produce the lion’s share of Ukrainian GDP (about 25%). 
The NBU’s Business Expectations of the Ukrainian Enterprises Project (in 
Ukrainian only) summarizes and analyzes the results of a survey of 1200 or more 
firms (a representative sample). Among other questions, the respondents are asked 
about their expectations of growth (or decline), for the coming 12 months, con-
cerning the country’s overall economic activities (GDP), the expected volume of 
sales of firms’ own products, as well as of inflation and exchange rate. They are 
also asked about their self-assessment of economic performance of their firms, 
change in the stocks and employment, etc. The answers are further analyzed in the 
quarterly bulletins. They are broken down by industries, firms’ sizes, and regions. 
However, no synthetic indexes are calculated. Unfortunately, this survey was 
launched only at the fall of 2006, so the time series available now are much too 
short for standard econometric estimations. 
The DerzhComStat’s Research and Project Institute for Statistical Tech-
nologies (RPIST) is running its own Survey of Business Performance and Ex-
pectations. The respondents are asked about current situation and trends, and their 
expectations of current and future trends in output, demand, capacity utilization, 
prices for their own goods or services, and stocks. Unlike the rest of indicators 
under review, the authors (Пугачова, 2006) are trying to correct for seasonality. 
Then they build composite indexes by sectors (industry, construction, and trading) 
using simple averages of respective balances of responses normalized by their 
standard deviations. Compositions of indexes differ from sector to sector. In most 
cases the indexes include self-assessments of current and future trends in output 
                                                                                                                           
13 Ibid. 
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formulated in the ways specific to particular sectors (like stocks in the industrial 
sector; future contracts in construction, and expected sales in trade). Then the au-
thors propose to build a composite index for GDP by aggregating of sector-
specific indexes weighted by the share of each sector in the total value added. 
However, a chart produced by the authors does not convincingly prove that the 
proposed indicator works well as a CLI, at least during the period covered by the 
study14. More recent results show a somewhat better predicting power starting 
from 2005. However, the peaks occurring every four quarters that are so well pre-
dicted by a model may be attributed to the mere seasonal effects (either underesti-
mated, or overestimated). It may be suggested that, for example, in the year of 
2005 some kinds of structural changes have led to a sharp increase in the magni-
tude of seasonality effect, and perhaps also to some changes in the period of oscil-
lations. 
 
Figure 2. Seasonally adjusted month-to-month changes in the industrial output (%):  
actual (lower line) and forecasted using the RPIST’s CLI (upper line) 
 
Source: RPIST’s bulletin, http://www.ntkstat.kiev.ua/nedos1.2008.htm. 
 
The common weakness of both surveys may be a selection bias that is hard to 
assess. The firms often ignore surveys of this sort,  and even if they decide to fill 
in the survey questionnaire they delegate mid-level personnel (which is often not 
competent) instead of the CEOs.  
The ICPS calculates the Index of Consumer Confidence as presented in the 
Box 2. 
                                                 
14 http://www.ntkstat.kiev.ua/nedos1.2008.htm  
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Box 2. ICPS: Index of Consumer Confidence 
In Ukraine, the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) is compiled from a random sample 
survey of country’s population; the survey includes 1,000 people aged from 15 to 59. The 
people of this age make up 61.3% of the Ukrainian population, and they are the most ac-
tive consumers. The survey sample is representative by gender and age, and it is stratified 
by the type and size of settlement. Statistical error does not exceed 3.2%. 
To define the CCI, respondents are asked the following questions: 
1. How has the financial position of your family changed over the last six months? 
2. In your opinion, how will your family’s financial position change during the 
next six months? 
3. In your opinion, will the next twelve months be a good time or bad time for the 
country’s economy? 
4. In your opinion, will the next five years be good time or bad time for the coun-
try’s economy? 
5. Is it now a good or bad time to make large purchases for your needs? 
With regard to these questions, the corresponding indexes are calculated: 
• Index of current personal financial position (x1) 
• Index of expected changes in the personal financial position (x2) 
• Index of expected changes in economic conditions of the country within the 
next year (x3) 
• Index of expected economic conditions in the country within the next five 
years (x4), and 
• Index of propensity to consume (x5). 
The indexes are constructed in the following way: from the number of positive an-
swers the number of negative answers is deducted, and to this difference one hundred is 
added in order to eliminate the occurrence of any negative values. On the basis of these 
five indexes, three aggregate indexes are calculated: 
• Consumer confidence index (CCI)—arithmetic average (AA) of indices x1–x5 
• Index of the current situation (ICS)—AA of indices x1 and x5, and 
• Index of economic expectations (IEE)—AA of indices x2, x3, and x4 
Index values range from 0 to 200. The index value equals 200 when all respondents 
positively assess the economic situation. The index totals 100 when the shares of positive 
and negative assessments are equal. Indices of less than 100 indicate the prevalence of 
negative assessments. 
To determine the Index of Expected Changes in Unemployment (IECU) and the Index 
of Inflationary Expectations (IIE), the respondents are asked the following two questions: 
1. In your opinion, during the next twelve months the number of unemployed 
(people who do not have a job and are looking for it) will increase, will remain 
roughly the same, or will decrease? 
2. In your opinion, will the prices for major consumer goods and services in-
crease during the next 1–2 months? 
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The IECU and the IIE are calculated in the following way: from the number  of an-
swers that indicate the growth of unemployment/inflation, the number of answers that 
indicate the decrease of unemployment/inflation is subtracted, and to this difference one 
hundred is added to eliminate the occurrence of negative values. The values of indexes 
can vary within the range of 0 to 200. The index totals 200 when all residents expect an 
increase in unemployment/inflation15. 
 
 
4.2 Hard-data based indicators 
 
Although potentially useful as one of the possible components of a tentative 
CLI, the survey-based indicators on their own could not be good predictors for 
GDP growth rates in Ukraine, at least as long as the economy remains predomi-
nantly export-oriented. All of these indicators share common inherent problems of 
survey data, including the quarterly periodicity. For these reasons all of the our 
candidate LIs are based on the hard data. However, to our knowledge, as of now 
none of such kinds of indicators is being compiled in Ukraine. In this section we 
review two attempts that were made in the past.  
The ICPS’s CLI was calculated for 19 consecutive months starting from Janu-
ary, 2006. Now this work is discontinued. This indicator includes five compo-
nents, namely: 
• World prices of ferrous metals; 
• Retail turnover; 
• Monetary aggregate M3; 
• Hryvnya deposit interest rates; 
• Private sector long-term liabilities (banking loans only). 
These components are aggregated similarly to the ones of BCI (The U.S. Con-
ference Board).  
The results, as shown in Figure 3, are interesting but ambiguous, as they do 
predict a few important shifts in trends, but fail to do it in several other cases, and 
provide too many false signals. While the interest rates may have coincided with 
GDP growth at some moments, but it seems that their inclusion is not well justi-
fied. This indicator could bring a lot of noise. The retail turnover is also likely to 
be rather a coincident indicator than a leading one. 
                                                 
15 http://www.icps.kiev.ua/eng/publications/cci_calculation.html  
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The IEF approach is based on analysis of the national accounts. Instead of us-
ing proxies, the attempt is made to estimate theoretical components of the GDP 
(both those on the expenditure side and the income side). Although theoretically 
justified (in general), such an approach has a weakness of being based on the quar-
terly data that are, in addition, available only with a substantial lag after the end of 
the quarter.  
 
Figure 3. The ICPS’s leading index (solid line) and changes in real GDP* 
 
* Moving average. 
Source: ICPS and DerzhComStat. 
 
The components of this index include: 
On the expenditure side (flows): 
• Real final household consumption; 
• Real final government consumption; 
• Export; 
• Import; 
• Real investment. 
On the income side (stocks): 
• Real increase in fixed assets; 
• Real change in total liabilities on banking loans; 
• Real total cash balances on the bank accounts. 
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Their changes (quarter to quarter) are calculated with lags up to one year. In 
other versions the authors are trying a number of other components, particularly of 
the “social sector” (employment, transfers, disposable household incomes, and 
wage arrears). 
This indicator was calculated in a few versions, none of which, however, pro-
vides a really good prediction (see Figures 4 and 5). Although the authors claim 
that their CLI for “demand” and “supply” sides could be good predictors for GDP 
growth with a lag of four quarters (one year) with probabilities of 74% and 79%, 
respectively, the time series presented in the report are clearly insufficient for any 
reliable evaluation. The composition of indexes is arguable, since, for instance, 
there is little evidence of a strong relationship between investments in fixed assets 
(which is used twice) and future GDP growth in Ukraine. However, the idea of 
using these components with some time lags is interesting and deserves further 
consideration. 
 
Figure 4. Actual and predicted GDP growth (IEF indicators, versions 1B, 2B, and C) 
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Source: IEF report. 
 
 
4.3 CLI index for Ukraine: Conclusions 
 
There were several attempts of building the CLIs in Ukraine, some of them re-
sulted in proposed composite indexes. As of now, none of these CLIs is calculated 
on a permanent basis, with a possible exception for the expectation index put for-
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ward by DerzhComStat. Among the accessible LIs, no one demonstrates sufficient 
predicting power, at least based on the time series used by their authors.  
 
Figure 5. Actual and predicted GDP growth (IEF indicators, versions 1A and 2A) 
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Source: IEF report. 
 
There is an attempt of building a composite index of confidence based on the 
results of surveys. However, the field for building an index based on hard data is 
almost empty. Hence as of now the existing leading indicators fail to provide de-
cently reliable early warning signals for downward shifts in economic growth 
rates. We could suggest the following reasons for this. 
The most developed of them are survey-based. Although being a potentially 
useful component of a good CLI, the survey data have numerous shortcomings. 
First of all, they by definition cannot capture the effects of “overshooting” or “un-
dershooting” that are important sources of cyclical slowdowns of growth and re-
cessions. While a survey-based CLI may predict continuation of growth, the turn 
may occur that is caused precisely by the excessively optimistic perception of 
market players that is reflected in this kind of CLI. It may be a result of a collec-
tive mistake. The latter may become quite large in transition economies due to in-
sufficient experience of the market players. 
The hard data indicators have not been well developed. The initial research ef-
forts involving the use of hard data for CLI have been discontinued. Partly, this is 
because of their insufficiently good performance. Another possible reason is 
wrong targeting. The ICPS CLI was built according to the U.S. Conference Board 
methodology, thus aimed at prediction of cyclical recessions driven predominantly 
by contraction of the domestic demand, which thus far have not happened in 
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Ukraine and are unlikely to happen in the near future16. The IEF attempt was 
rather about building a comprehensive econometric model for GDP growth, which 
is a far more challenging task, remaining beyond the scope of our project. 
Time series that are available for calculations of econometric parameters and 
testing model results are quite short. Moreover the economy keeps rapidly evolv-
ing, which makes previously defined structural parameters obsolete within a few 
years. In particular, we see no sense in using the pre-2000 data, even if they were 
accurate and available17. Furthermore, substantial changes occurred around the 
year of 2004. In particular, we have found that the financial indicators appear more 
significant than foreign trade indicators if the data for 2003-2008 are analyzed. 
Another visible effect of this is a change in the behavior of the RPIST’s survey-
based CLI: it looks like the seasonality smoothing that worked decently in the pre-
vious years (and was probably tuned on the past data) has failed afterwards.  
We are going to address these shortcomings in the following ways. 
• For a comprehensive CLI we should consider the components based on 
both the hard data and survey-based data; 
• We are going to test the predictive power of selected indicators for warn-
ing against economic downturns (the situations in which the growth falls 
below a medium-term trend); 
• Prediction of downturns (including recessions, i.e., negative growth) is a 
complementary task to the standard econometric modeling based on long 
time series of macroeconomic aggregates (indicators). It can improve the 
predictive power of such a modeling, at least at the qualitative level. 
These downturns have already been observed in Ukraine, in particular in 
2002 and 2005. However, we do not pretend on building an econometric 
model for the economic growth able to predict both short-term and long-
term changes in the rate of growth. 
We put forward some ideas on the ways of improvement of currently used 
methodology in order to adjust it to the conditions of rapidly evolving economies, 
such as the Ukrainian one. 
                                                 
16 This sentence was written in summer 2008. Today (in December 2008) we already know 
that the occurrence of a recession in the Ukrainian economy is not an unlikely event., 
17 Firstly, the data are unreliable. Secondly, they should be adjusted for unpaid arrears, 
barter, and other phenomena that constituted the so called virtual economy. Thirdly, these 
data can be misleading, since at that time Ukraine experienced an unprecedented recession, 
which was caused by decay and then breakdown of the USSR, while not having much in 
common with standard business cycles. 
Janusz Szyrmer, Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Inna Golodniuk 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 85 32 
5. Selection of the candidate LIs 
for Ukraine18 
Selection of the candidate LIs was made in several stages. 
At the first stage, we studied the available literature on the leading indicators. 
There were 14 OECD countries19 and 18 emerging markets20 for which we found 
the literature on such kinds of indicators. Tables presented in Appendices 1 and 2 
summarize our findings at this stage. 
Next, we selected our candidate LIs given their availability in Ukraine, and 
theoretical reasons described above. For some of them we tried to find or build 
proxy variables. Besides, we decided to include a proxy for price changes, which 
is based on the index of producers’ prices (PPI). Similar indicator of the wholesale 
price index is used in the Philippines. The PPI matters in comparison to the CPI, 
and should be adjusted with the world prices on export commodities. As a result, 
we ended up with a list of candidate variables (Table 1). 
Next all the candidate variables but interest rates, were expressed as percent 
monthly changes, year-on-year (e.g., Export data for May 2001 were expressed as 
percent change with respect to May 2000). In the next step all variables were de-
trended, as recommended by the OECD (1987). Following this recommendation21 
we used the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter λ=14400 for 
isolation of the long-term trend, and then subtracted it from the original data. This 
also made the means for all variables equal zeroes. 
Still, if we include all of these variables with different time lags, the total num-
ber of independent variables would be too high for a time series regression model 
with only about 90 observations. For this reason we performed the preliminary 
qualitative analysis in two ways.  
                                                 
18 For an overview of economic indicators see: Frumkin (2000) and The Economist Guide 
(2003). 
19Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. 
20 Brazil, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Repub-
lic, and South Africa.  
21 Nilsson and Gyomai (2007). 
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One way consisted of drawing charts of detrended, the smoothed (by means of 
the HP filter with λ=50) and normalized (by standard deviation) data series for 
each of candidate variables and we compared them to the corresponding series for 
industrial production (our dependent variable). Some examples of those charts are 
provided in Appendix 4. Then we identified those potential LIs that behave quali-
tatively differently from the target variable, namely: 
• Money aggregate M2; 
• Retail turnover; 
• Households incomes and expenditures. 
They were excluded from further considerations. 
 
Table 1. List of candidate LI variables 
Factor Desirable indicators Availability, proxies 
GDP growth GDP monthly changes Index of industrial output, 
monthly 
Price shifts Adjusted PPI A ratio of PPI to CPI divided by 
the index of metal prices; also the  
reciprocal PPI 
Business confidence and 
expectations 
Survey-based indexes Available on the quarterly basis 
only 
Retail turnover Poor quality of data Domestic demand 
Households incomes or 
expenditures 
Poor quality of data 
Terms of trade Index of the world prices on steel 
(not available directly, instead 
the IMF’s metal price index is 
used) 
Trade balance Available 
Foreign trade 
Volume of exports Available  
Volume of loans Available 
Interest rate on loans Available; also its reciprocal was 
tried 
Bad loans Not available; poor quality of 
data, even if available 
Financial markets 
Money aggregate M2 Available 
Purchasing power of domes-
tic currency 
Real effective exchange 
rate 
Available (in the version: the 
effective exchange rate adjusted 
for CPI) 
External markets GDP growth of main 
trade partners 
Industrial production indexes for 
the EU and Russia 
 
This analysis also suggested to us that the lags for independent variables com-
paring to the dependent one should be taken within a range of 18 months at least, 
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since average duration of a cycle is about three years, which perfectly corresponds 
to the Kitchin’s result. It was also helpful in choosing the optimal forms for par-
ticular variables (as reciprocals in some cases), which may better work as the LIs. 
Particularly, we decided to try the reciprocal interest rate, and reciprocal adjusted 
PPI. 
Then we built the Pearson correlation tables for all remaining indicators and 
their lags for 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 months. Their analysis allowed us to select the 
variables that had the highest correlations with industrial production (our target 
variable, i.e., the proxy for the economic cycle), and, at the same time, were inde-
pendent from each other. They were included in the initial specification of the 
model. 
At the same time we tried another way, which is methodologically to some ex-
tent akin to the approach used by the U.S. Conference Board. The Board predicts 
the probability of recession basing on the raise or decline of the leading indicators, 
and the composite leading index. Similarly to this, we tried to build a simplified 
version of leading index that would predict episodes of lower-than-average growth 
basing on the binary representation of leading indicators, and the composite binary 
index. 
For each of our candidate LIs we calculated two kinds of binary indicators: (1) 
The “positive indicator” set to 1 whenever the value of the original variable is 
above the trend, and set to 0 otherwise; (2) The “negative indicator” set to 1 when-
ever the value of the original variable is below the trend, and set to 0 otherwise. 
Similarly we built the positive and negative indicators for the target variable, 
which was later used as the dependent variable for the probit model. For the 
lagged variables with consecutive lags varying from 3 to 18 months with a step of 
three months we calculated the percentage of correctly predicted observations for 
the binary form of industrial output22. These numbers can be treated as “predicting 
power” of each of the candidates, because they characterize the percentage of cor-
rectly predicted below-the-trend or above-the-trend points of industrial output. 
For the binary variables built in such a way, a mere constant or random num-
bers would have a predicting power of about one-half. Moreover, if the cycle was 
perfectly sinusoid, the 3-month lag of dependent variable (or a fully coinciding 
one) would have a predicting power of two-thirds. Therefore only the indicators 
having a significantly better predictive power were worth of consideration within 
this approach. In Table 2 we provide the best performing individual LIs with a 
                                                 
22 We used the sum of squared differences between a binary candidate LI and the binary 
industrial output, divided by the number of observations, and then subtracted from a unit. 
As soon as the difference is zero in case of coincidence, and either 1 or -1 otherwise, sum 
of squares provides a number of discrepancies. 
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predicting power over 70%.  As one can see, the LIs with lags of 18 and 6 months 
have the highest predicting powers. For instance, exports alone can predict a slow-
down in 18 months with a probability of 79%. Lagged industrial output also has a 
predictive power of about 77% in 18 months (and over 78% in 17 months, not re-
ported here). In the meantime, there is a period of 9-15 month lags with almost no 
good LIs. 
 
Table 2 Best performing leading indicators (binary form) 
Negative: 
   Export Exports- (-18) 79.0% 
   Industrial Output INDoutput- (-18) 77.0% 
   Value of Bank Credits Credits- (-18) 75.0% 
   Interest Rate Credit%- (-6) 71.0% 
Positive: 
   Real Effective Exchange Rate REXrate+ (-6) 77.0% 
   EU’s Industrial Output EUoutput+ (-6) 75.9% 
  Adjusted PPI AdjPPI+ (-18) 74.7% 
   Real Effective Exchange Rate REXrate+ (-9) 72.4% 
 
These binary-form LIs can be added (in terms of the Boolean sum, which is 
equal to 1 if at least some of its arguments are 1), or multiplied (the Boolean prod-
uct is equal 1 if all of its arguments are 1). By simple comparison of a few possible 
combinations we derived a primitive composite leading indicator that can issue a 
warning signal in 18 months with a probability of 81.6%. It is: 
CLI1 = Exports- (-18) + AdjPPI+ (-18), 
where “+“ means logical (Boolean) sum. In other words, when either the adjusted 
PPI is below the trend, or export is above the trend, then with a probability of 
81.6% in one year and a half (hence, over a one half-period of the cycle) the indus-
trial production will appear below the trend, and vice versa. Exports tend to coin-
cide with output cycles while domestic producer prices behave countercyclically. 
Low PPIs coincide with high output and high PPIs coincide with low output. 
In particular, from December 2004 to May 2006, the index of industrial pro-
duction year-on-year appeared below the long-term trend. Those times many ex-
perts attributed this slowdown mostly to political reasons, such as uncertainty re-
lated to presidential elections, political crisis of the Orange revolution, and diverse 
controversial policies. However, with the proposed indicator in hand, this slow-
down could be almost precisely predicted in 18 months before, when these politi-
cal changes could be hardly predicted. 
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6. An early warning forecast model 
for Ukraine 
6.1 Recession and Growth Cycle Modeling Literature  
 
Under leading indicator we understand, as in OECD (1987), an indicator whose 
cycle turns consistently a fixed number of months before that of growth cycle in-
dicator. 
Empirical literature on recession modeling vastly uses probit models to con-
clude on leading indicators showing good performance in business cycle forecast-
ing. 
Earlier generation of empirical studies relied on static binary time series mod-
els. Such models estimated probability of economy being in recession (binary out-
come) as a function of explanatory variables and their lags and leads only. Result 
of Estrella and Mishkin (1998) about recession forecasting power of interest rate 
spreads and stock prices was received using a static binary model. Variables such 
as interest rates and spreads, stock prices, and monetary aggregates, together with 
other financial and nonfinancial indicators, were tested for potential early warning 
properties. The analyses focused on the out-of-sample performance from one to 
eight quarters ahead. Results showed that stock prices are useful with one- to 
three-quarter horizons. 
Similar econometric methodology applying static model was used by Bernard 
and Gerlach (1998). The authors look for cross-country evidence on the usefulness 
of term spreads (difference between long-term and short-term rate of interest) in 
predicting the probability of a recession within the subsequent eight quarters, us-
ing quarterly data for eight countries – Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, spanning from 1972 
to 1994. 
Most recent econometric works used dynamic probit models (Duecker, 1997; 
Valcks et al., 2002; Moneta, 2003; Chauvet and Potter, 2005; Kauppi and 
Saikkonen, 2007; and Nyberg, 2008). The key difference between a dynamic and a 
static probit model is that the former includes, among other indicators, lagged val-
ues of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable (and potentially a leading 
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indicator). Dynamic models were found to perform better, since static models ne-
glect significant information in autocorrelation structure of dependent variable, 
which is helpful to make better prediction.  
Using a dynamic probit model Valcks et al. (2002) investigated whether inter-
est rate and stock market volatility play a role as recession indicators. The results 
showed that interest rate and stock return volatility did not contribute systemati-
cally to the forecasting of recessions in the U.S., but did so, to some extent, in 
other OECD countries. 
Moneta (2003) used a similar model to test whether slope of the yield curve can 
be a good predictor of recessions in the euro area. Estimation results show that the 
yield spread between the ten-year government bond rate and the three-month in-
terbank rate outperforms all other spreads in predicting recessions in the euro area. 
Kauppi and Saikkonen (2007) developed dynamic binary probit models for 
predicting U.S. recessions using the interest rate spread as the driving predictor. 
The models used recession dummy lags - lags of the binary response - to allow 
and test for the potential forecast power of lags of the underlying conditional prob-
ability. 
Chauvet and Potter (2005) compared early warning performance of four differ-
ent specifications of the probit model: a time-invariant conditionally independent 
version, a business cycle specific conditionally independent model, a time-
invariant probit with autocorrelated errors, and a business cycle specific probit 
with autocorrelated errors. The business cycle specific probit model with autocor-
related errors was found to perform better in modeling business cycles in the U.S. 
economy using yield curve information. 
Our modeling effort was limited to static probit specifications. The relatively 
small size of our time series (2000 through 2008) did not allow for a large number 
of independent variables. We decided to limit our analysis to the simplest variants 
of the probit model. The dependent variable was specified as a binary zero-one 
change in Ukraine industrial output, which was used as a proxy for economic 
growth. The change was calculated as monthly year-on-year change value, de-
trended and normalized. 
 
 
6.2 Probit Models 
 
In binary time series analysis the dependent variable ty is a time series realiza-
tion of the stochastic process that takes on only binary values. 
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In our growth cycle modeling the value of the observed growth cycle indicator 
is defined in the following way: 
}{
/,0
,1
ttimeatdeclinegrowthslowatiscyclegrowththeif
ttimeatgrowthfastatiscyclegrowththeifyt = , 
where ty  has a Bernoulli distribution, conditional on information set observable at 
time (t-1). If tp  is the conditional probability that ty  =1,  
)()(1 tttt zpyE Φ=≡− . 
In probit models )( tzΦ  is standard normal probability density function. 
As we indicated above, dynamic probit models demonstrated better perform-
ance in explaining and forecasting business cycles compared to static models. 
Therefore, following the most recent empirical literature, we specify our model as 
follows:  
1
/
−− ++= tktt yxz δβα , 
where ktx − – vector of explanatory variables, 1−ty  – lagged value of explanatory 
variable.  
In all of the above models the dependent variable is binary, it is either zero or 
one. Binary models estimate the probability of a dependent variable taking value 
of 1 as function of explanatory variables: 
βα tt xxyP ′+== )|1( . 
Since probability is contained between 0 and 1, we cannot use least squares esti-
mators, both linear and non-linear, as they get predictions outside the [0;1] interval. 
Probit and logit are the two most common methods to analyze binary depend-
ent variable models. Probit uses cumulative distribution function of a normal dis-
tribution as an assumed relationship between probability of a binary outcome of a 
dependent variable and explanatory variables. Logit relies on logistic function23 to 
specify the relationship between the probability of a binary outcome and explana-
tory variables. Both cumulative the normal distribution function and logit function 
capture all important properties of probability. Most important, they are contained 
between 0 and 1. Probit function, in addition, provides probability of observing a 
binary variable outcome assuming normal distribution of explanatory variables. 
Probit models (and logit models) are estimated using Maximum Likelihood Es-
timator (see Box 3). 
                                                 
23 Logistic function is defined G(z)=exp(z)/[1+exp(z)], where z – standard normal variable. 
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Box 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) principle is based on the idea that the sample 
of data we observe is more likely to have come from a particular population characterized 
by particular parameters than from a population characterized by any other set of parame-
ters. The Maximum Likelihood estimate of parameter values is a particular parameter that 
gives the largest probability of obtaining the observed sample assuming that the underly-
ing population is normally distributed. 
The mechanics of MLE is as follows24. Each of the observations we have in our sam-
ple is a random draw from some normal distribution. It can be a draw from a normal dis-
tribution A characterized by its parameters, meanA and varianceA, or a normal distribution 
B with meanB and varianceB. To determine the underlying population distribution, MLE 
first specifies likelihood function and then finds parameter values that maximize the like-
lihood function. 
 
Likelihood function is found as a product of probabilities of each specific observation 
in our sample. Probability of each observation point is expressed using probability den-
sity function of a normal population. 
MLE has important statistical properties. It is consistent and asymptotically efficient. 
Re: Consistent estimator converges in probability to the population parameter as the 
sample size grows. 
Asymptotically efficient estimator: for consistent estimators with asymptotically nor-
mal distributions, the estimator with the smallest asymptotic variance. 
Since MLE properties critically depend on the normality assumption, one has to make 
sure the sample at hand is large enough to minimally satisfy the assumptions of 
normality. The smaller the sample size, the worse is the statistical performance of MLE. 
 
                                                 
24 This picture and interpretation are borrowed from Peter Kennedy’s “A Guide to Economet-
rics” (2003), one of the most intuitive and simplest explanations we met in the literature. 
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6.3 Model application 
 
Our qualitative analysis of variables concluded that growth cycle changes were 
related to and possibly preceded by the variables listed in Table 3 and Appendix 3 
(in the format of monthly growth rates calculated year-on-year). 
General principles for econometric specification maintain that “testing down” 
is more suitable than “testing up” in a sense that it reduces chances that a statisti-
cally significant variable be erroneously excluded. Therefore, one should begin 
with the general unrestricted model and then systematically simplify it in the light 
of sample evidence and understanding of the underlying economic phenomena in 
question. 
While working on the original formulation we made it as general as our data set 
allowed so that we could reasonably be sure we were moving from a more general 
to a simpler specification testing for joint significance of coefficient sets. 
Model 1A was the most general specification we could estimate given limited 
data set size and the nature of our task – developing a simple warning tool, rather 
than a complete forecast model. In particular, 
• In Model 1A we included all the variables listed in Table 3; 
• We did not include any contemporaneous explanatory variables. As we 
aimed to develop earlier warning, contemporaneous variables would un-
dermine the relevance of early warning; 
• In this specification we included the third, sixth, ninth, twelfth, fifteenth, 
and eighteenth lags for all independent variables; 
• Model 1A was estimated with the Jan.00–Jun.08 sample. During the first 
half of the sample period Ukrainian banks did not play a major role in 
channeling investments into the economy; bank credit level remained at 
quite a low level. Starting 2003-04 as banks were becoming more so-
phisticated and businesses and households started using bank credits 
more extensively, the banks became a factor affecting growth cycles – 
the hypothesis we later empirically confirmed by testing 2003-08 data 
(Model 1C) To simplify the model we tested for joint significance of the 
variables having sizeable associated p-values of their respective coeffi-
cients. F-tests for various sets of coefficients were implemented to iden-
tify a variable set with the highest probability that these coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero. All subsequent model specifications were limited to 
this set of variables with subsets of the lags listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. List of variables used in probit models 
Variable name Variable description Lags 
INDoutput  Change in real industrial output (dependent variable)  
C Intercept  
AdjPPI Adjusted PPI, % -6 
Credit% Bank credit interest rate, % -3, -6, -9, and -18 
Credits Value of credits, UAH -3 and -9 
EUoutput Change in real EU industrial output, % -3, -6, -9, and -12 
Exports Value of exports, USD -3, -6, and -9 
REXrate Real effective exchange rate, % -6 and -9 
RUSoutput Change in real Russia industrial output, % -12 
 
In Model 1B the sample Jan00-Jun08 was used. It included only variables 
with selected lags with time intervals no longer than nine months, the best per-
formers were: EUoutput(-6), AdjPPI(-6), Credit%(-3) and Credit%(-9). This sup-
ports our hypotheses that the best predictors for Ukraine cycle shifts are exports to 
the EU, proxied by shifts in EU’s industrial output, as well as domestic prices of 
producer goods (adjusted for world prices of metals and prices of domestic con-
sumer goods) and prices of money (bank credit interest rates). 
Model 1C was covering only Jan03-Jun08 data. This models illustrates the in-
creased role of the banking sector in Ukraine. In addition to very high significance 
of EU’s industrial output (EUoutput(-9)) and credit interest rates (Credit%(-9)), 
the value of credits (Credits(-9)) turn to become highly significant. 
In Model 2, as well as Models 3 and 4, a longer time series is used: Jan00-
Sep08. In Model 2 again EUs output (EUoutput(-3)) and credit interest rate 
(Credit%(-6)) are the most significant. 
EUoutput(-6) performs very well in Models 3 and 4. Moreover, credit interest 
rate is highly significant in Model 3 (Credit%(-9) and Credit%(-18)). In Model 4, 
the value of bank credits (Credits(-3)) is the best performer. 
Interestingly, our hypotheses were not right concerning the importance of Rus-
sian output. Unlike the impact of EU’s output, the impact of Russian output on 
Ukraine economic activities turned out only marginally significant. This can be 
partially explained by the fact that more Ukraine exports are directed to EU than to 
Russia. Also the differences in the structures of Ukraine exports to EU and Russia 
are significant, which may influence the pattern of economic dependence. 
Most important goodness-of-fit measure in the limited dependent variable 
models is the percent of dependent variable values that are correctly predicted by 
the model. Model 1B provided accurate predictions 84 times and it failed in 9 
cases. For this model the McFadden R-square was 68%. Model 2 correctly pre-
dicted 71 out of 87 growth cycle observations, and the McFadden R-squared was 
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50%. Actual values of growth cycle and those predicted by Model 2 are presented 
in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Actual and predicted values of growth cycle (Model 2) 
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Qualitative explanation of the model’s results is relatively straightforward for 
most of variables. For the best performing model (Model 1B) it may be as follows. 
The PPI adjusted for inflation and the metal price index, with a lag of 6 months 
has a negative sign. It goes fully in accordance with our hypothesis concerning the 
role of price inflexibility (see Section 3). Similarly, by no surprise real exchange 
rate enters the model with the same lag and positive sign (which means, more 
hryvnyas per one unit of foreign currency, the latter expressed as a basket of dol-
lars and euros). The lower price for domestic goods accounted in foreign currency, 
the more competitive they become and the higher growth would be. 
The reciprocal to bank interest rate on loans (Credit%) enters the model with 
lags of 3 and 9 months, both times with positive signs. This most probably corre-
sponds to the trade loans for output (e.g., supermarkets purchasing goods from the 
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factories), and inputs (e.g. tolling operations), respectively. This indicator cumula-
tively (taking into account both lags) appears the strongest explanatory factor. 
Exports enters the model with two lags of 6 and 9 months, with almost equal 
coefficients, and opposite signs. This means that while Exports (change in the vol-
ume of exports) per se is most probably a coinciding variable, its growth (a second 
derivative from the volume of exports) appears to be a leading one. 
Positive impact of the EU industrial output is straightforward. It leads both the 
exports, and the Ukrainian industrial output. But the difference appears to have 
quite a complex structure. The components related to Exports and EUoutput al-
most cancel each other on the positive or negative slopes of both variables. Only 
near the peaks and troughs the difference turns to be significant, because the EU-
output leads Exports. Thus, such a combination of variables mostly captures peaks 
and troughs in Exports, which indeed precede the periods of above-trend or below-
trend of industrial output (see Figure 2A). 
 
Box 4. Binary Model Diagnostic Statistics 
McFadden R-squared  
McFadden R-squared is an analogy of R-squared used for binary response models. 
McFadden R-squared is often called pseudo R-squared to reflect the fact that interpreta-
tion of the measure has parallels with R-squared reported for least squares models, how-
ever the definition and functional form are different. There are alternative, less commonly 
used, definitions for pseudo-R-squared. 
Re: Conventional R-squared, or coefficient of determination, reported for models in-
volving LS estimators provides total variation of dependent variable explained by varia-
tions in the explanatory variables. Algebraically, total variation of the dependent variable 
y about its mean Σ( y – y )2 is called the total sum of squares. The “explained” variation, 
the sum of squared deviations of the estimated values of the dependent variable y around 
their mean Σ( yˆ – y )2 is called the regression sum of squared. Coefficient of determina-
tion, R-squared, is defined as ratio of regression sum of squares to total sum of squares. 
McFadden R-squared is defined as (1-likelihood function for estimated 
model/likelihood function for a model with only intercept). This definition does offer 
some parallels with explanatory power interpretation of a conventional R-squared. 
For models estimated using MLE Likelihood function for estimated model including 
any explanatory variables is always smaller or equal to likelihood function for a model 
with only intercept. If the variables in the model have no explanatory power the ratio is 
equal to 1 and R-squared equals zero. As explanatory power gets better, increases the 
difference between the two likelihood functions as captured by McFadden R-squared. 
McFadden R-squared is useful, however, is rarely used alone to measure binary 
model performance. A single most important measure of binary model performance is 
proportion of the dependent value outcomes predicted correctly by the model. 
We present McFadden R-squared statistics for our model results for convenience of 
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ultimate users of the model, who routinely use R-squared statistics and may find McFad-
den statistics provide intuitive analogy. 
p-value 
p-value has a conventional interpretation in probit models. It is defined as the prob-
ability for committing an error of rejecting a null hypothesis (of no relationship between a 
corresponding independent variable and the dependent variable) when it is true, also 
called level of significance of the hypothesis test. The smaller the p-value, the stronger 
the evidence against the null hypothesis in favor of an alternative hypothesis. 
In our model we test for coefficients in front of each explanatory variable to be equal 
to zero (null hypothesis). That is we assume that there is no relationship between an ex-
planatory variable in question and the dependent variable and look for empirical evidence 
in the data to reject the null. p-value is the smallest significance level at which we can 
reject the null (confirm that coefficients are non-zero). If a p-value, for example, is 5% 
we conclude that we can reject the null at 5% significance level or, simpler, that the prob-
ability that the coefficient equal zero is 5%. 
z-statistic 
z is a standard normal variable. z-statistic (rather than t-statistic) is used because pro-
bit models assume normal distribution of explanatory variables. For this reason standard 
normal distribution is used for inference in hypothesis testing for binary models. 
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7. Conclusions 
The main kinds of cautions in using the proposed indicators are related to a 
short period of observations, on the one hand; and rapid changes in the Ukrainian 
economy, on the other hand. 
The observed period was shorter than a typical mid-term cycle. Only in the last 
quarter of 2008 we observed a recession that is partly caused by the global crisis, but 
to a certain extent it is likely to be a sort of “cleanup” after the boom. Now it is too 
early to derive any conclusions from the recent events. But although even our primi-
tive two-component indicator does predict the slowdown (below-the-trend rates of 
growth) for the whole period July-December 2008, and so does the model based on 
the data for Jan00-Jun08, they could not foretell the depth of this slowdown, i.e., 
could not tell us whether to expect a recession (a negative growth), or just a contin-
ued growth at a below-trend rate. In fact, our modeling effort was not designed for 
this purpose. Only when at least a couple of mid-term cycles occur, one can try to 
build an early warning indicator for such kinds of slowdowns based on some histori-
cal evidence. As of now, we can only hypothesize about possible leading indicators 
for slowdowns and recessions occurring within a mid-term cycle. 
The parameters and compositions of proposed indicators are appropriate for the 
observed period of time. But they will not necessarily hold in the future. More-
over, it is almost certain that they will evolve along with the whole Ukrainian 
economy. For this reason we strongly recommend to make annual revisions, and 
adjust the computations of CLI respectively. We hope that at least for several 
years adjustments of weights in the CLI would be sufficient to preserve a descent 
predicting power. But sooner or later the structural changes will alter its composi-
tion too. 
In order to account for this, we propose for the future applying additional 
weights representing the proxies for impacts of each particular sector. For in-
stance, several variables (such as exports, domestic credits, and stock market ac-
tivities) could be weighted by the corresponding GDP values, or their proxies. 
Such kinds of weights would automatically adjust the contributions of respective 
components to the CLI accordingly to the changing roles of respective factors. Our 
preliminary results suggest that such an amendment could significantly improve 
the predicting power of CLI. For instance, we have found that the coefficients at 
the LIs related to financial sector (as the interest rate) dramatically increase if the 
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data after 2003 are considered (Model 1C). This corresponds to the historical fact 
that in Ukraine consumer loans became widespread only after 2003. 
Next improvement to be considered is defining the peaks and troughs of de-
trended data (the so-called turning points). The OECD recommends to use the 
Bry-Boschan routine for this, and it is worthwhile to try for Ukraine, although the 
shortness of data time series may limit its applicability. 
And, of course, if the surveys be run on a monthly basis, then their results 
could be used for early warning predictions. There are a number of good CLIs 
among the survey collected data (like the business confidence index or inventory 
reports). Even if no monthly data is available it would be interesting to try to use 
the quarterly data subjected to interpolation and smoothing techniques. These ex-
periments remained outside of the scope of the work conducted by our project. 
However, the most important improvement that should be made is development 
of the LIs for the “shedding” of positive trends, hence the “crises”. 
By taking advantage of the experience of other countries, Ukraine should not 
only develop its analytic capacities to produce early warning CLIs, but also find a 
way to institutionalize them by delegating this job to a governmental agency or an 
NGO think-tank. In addition to all kinds of analyses and models, Ukraine needs a 
systematic monitoring system of the economy, whose main (and perhaps only) 
task would be to produce on a monthly basis early warning indicators and use 
them for a comprehensive analytic work. It seems that the U.S. Conference Board 
would provide a good example to follow (http://www.conference-board.org). 
It would also be helpful to develop a close cooperation with similar organiza-
tions, both governmental and NGOs, which are working on similar issues, espe-
cially in the emerging market economies, which share many features with Ukraine. 
For now, the most important task is to study the factors behind and effects of 
the current crisis and look for policy measures which would help the economy to 
return to a rapid growth path, as fast as possible. 
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Appendix 1. Leading indicators for the OECD countries 
 
 
INDICATORS Japan Austra-lia Austria Belgium 
Fin-
land France
Ger-
many Greece Ireland Italy Netherl. Norway 
Portu-
gal Spain Sweden
Swit-
zerl. UK 
Employment  T       T; Weekly     Layoffs   
Business situa-
tion Prospects  Prospects 
Bus.Cli
m    
Bus.Cli
m Prospects CapUtil   Profits 
Bottlenecks     %BN         %BN    
Stocks, volume 1     FinG FinG  FinG FinG FinG RawM RawM  FinG FinG RawM;FinG 
Demand     FT           PurchRM  
Order 
books/new or-
ders 
 T L T T  T;L  L L L;T  T L;FT L;T T L 
Production  T Metals;FT T,FT FT  FT  FT FT Dom; FT 
Ch;EG
W FT  T FT 
Construction  Permits  Starts.R    Permits     Permits  Dwell-ing   
Sales        5 Retail  Retail   Cars   Cars 
Money supply M1+QM 
M1+Q
M M1 M1+QM M1 M3 M1 
M1+Q
M M1 
M1+Q
M M1    M1+QM M1  
FinMarket rates Call-Rate   CallRate   Gov.Bond 
3Month
TB 
Gov.B
ond Gov.Bond   
Gov.Bo
nd 
Gov. 
Bond 
3Month
TB 
Depos-
its&loans/Forex 2    FX1, FX2  6   Dep      Credit 
Prices/Costs    FT  Raw.Mat M&M Const;WS  Input p. Const   Labor   
Share prices Index Index  Index  Index Index  Index   Index   Index Index Index 
Terms of 
trade/OECD.LI TT  
F,G,I,U
K   TT   TT TT TT     TT  
Export/Import 3  4  Wood;Pap  Orders    7 Orders  Orders   
Source: OECD (1987). 
Notes.  
%BN = % of firms expecting bottlenecks 
3MonthTB = 3 month treasury bill rate 
I = Employment in industry 
Index = Share price index  
TT = Terms of trade 
Weekly = Weekly hours of work, manufac-
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Bus.Clim = Business climate indicator 
CallRate = Call money rate 
CapUtil = Capacity utilization 
Cars = New passenger cars registered 
Ch = production of chemicals 
Const = Construction price index 
Credit = Consumer credit  
CU = Rate of capacity utilization 
Dep = Savings deposits 
Dom = Production of goods for domestic 
market 
Dwelling = Construction of dwellings in pro-
gress 
EGW = Production: electric, gas, water 
FinG = Stocks of finished goods, level 
FinMarket = Financial market 
FT = Future tendency 
FX1 = Bank of Finland foreign reserves 
FX2 = Foreign exchange reserves of other 
holders 
Gov.Bond = Yield on long-term government 
bonds 
Input p. = Input price index 
L = Level 
Labor = labor costs per unit of output 
Layoffs = Notices of lay-offs 
M&M = Labor cost in mining and manufac-
turing 
OECD.LI = OECD leading indicators for 
selected 
countries: France, Germany, Italy and UK 
Orders = Export order books, level 
Pap = Finland exports of paper industry 
products 
Permits = Construction permits issued 
Profits = Gross trading profits 
PurchRM = Purchase of raw materials, ten-
dency 
QM = Quasi money 
Raw.Mat = raw materials price changes 
RawM = Stocks of raw materials, level 
Starts.R = Construction starts, residential 
housing 
T = Tendency 
turing 
Wood = Finland exports of wood industry 
products 
WS = Wholesale price index 
Japan 
1. Stocks of finished goods, level; Total 
stocks in manuf; 
Producer inventory ratio to shipments 
2. New loans for equipment; ratio of loans to 
deposits 
3. Excess of imports over exports 
Austria 
4. German new orders 
Greece 
5. Retail sales, clothing and footware; Sales, 
future tendency 
6. Bank credit to manufacturing 
Norway 
7. IP export goods; Domestic goods for ex-
port; Stocks of imported products; export 
orders, tendency; Value of exports+B2 
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Appendix 2. Leading indicators for non-OECD countries and new OECD member states 
 
 
INDICATOR COUNTRIES WHERE IT IS USED 
Foreign trade   
Export volume BRAZIL, INDONESIA, Philippines (Hotel occupancy rate, tourist/visitor arrivals), JORDAN 
(Growth rate in the demand for domestic exports), Malaysia; Singapore (Total non-oil sea borne 
cargo handled; U.S. Purchasing Managers' Index (Manufacturing)) 
Import volume CHINA, HUNGARY, INDONESIA, the PHILIPPINES, INDIA, SINGAPORE (Total non-oil 
retained imports (NORI)) 
Net trade SLOVAKIA, RUSSIA, KOREA (BOP, Capital & financial accounts) 
Terms of trade BRAZIL, the PHILIPPINES 
Cargo handled at ports CHINA 
Prospects for major export articles RUSSIA (World price of oil), CYPRUS (Composite leading indicator for tourism) 
Performance of trade partners MALAYSIA (Industrial production in Korea, U.S. Federal Reserve rate) 
Exchange rate CYPRUS, INDONESIA, the PHILIPPINES, INDIA; POLAND ITHUANIA (Real effective ex-
change rate); SINGAPORE (Domestic liquidity indicator) 
Net usable reserves of the Central Bank JORDAN 
Prices   
CPI, WPI The PHILIPPINES 
Tendencies (prices) The CZECH REPUBLIC, SLOVAKIA, RUSSIA  
Production   
Production of certain kinds of non-
durables 
BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA, POLAND  
Stocks The CZECH REPUBLIC, KOREA, BRAZIL, RUSSIA (Stock level, retail trade), SINGAPORE 
Expectations  
Business confidence (production) KOREA, NEW ZEALAND, HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA, SOUTH AFRICA (Building plans, Busi-
ness confidence, manufacturing), CYPRUS (business climate indicators for manufacturing, tourism 
and services), INDIA, RUSSIA (Business situation, construction); Singapore (wholesale) 
Consumer expectations The CZECH REPUBLIC, NEW ZEALAND 
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INDICATOR COUNTRIES WHERE IT IS USED 
Entrepreneurship the PHILIPPINES, (Number of new business corporations), SINGAPORE 
Domestic demand    
Demand level (industry) or order inflow, 
manufacturing 
RUSSIA, SOUTH AFRICA, BRAZIL (Order books) 
Retail trade sales SLOVAKIA, NEW ZEALAND 
Motor cars sales SOUTH AFRICA, CYPRUS, BRAZIL 
Dwelling permits SOUTH AFRICA, CYPRUS 
Interest rates KOREA (Long term bond yield), NEW ZEALAND (Yield 3-monthbank bills), INDONESIA 
(Discount rate), HUNGARY (Central bank base interest rate), POLAND (3-month WIBOR inter 
bank rate), INDIA (Deposit interest rate, inverted), JORDAN (interest rate spread between three-
month Jordanian CD rates and the corresponding U.S. treasury bill rates); Lithuania (5-years 
loans), Singapore (Domestic liquidity indicator) 
Banking   
Interest rate spread SOUTH AFRICA,  
Net credit to the private sector JORDAN, LITHUANIA (Domestic credit) 
Foreign currency deposits in banking 
institutions; Government lending funds 
in deposit money banks; Foreign Assets 
LITHUANIA 
Money supply INDIA, HUNGARY, NEW ZEALAND (M1); CZECH REPUBLIC, KOREA, CHINA, RUSSIA, 
SINGAPORE (M2); CYPRUS, the PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, LITHUANIA (Quasi-money) 
Stock market RUSSIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SLOVAK REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, INDONESIA, INDIA, the 
CZECH REPUBLIC, BRAZIL, CYPRUS, the PHILIPPINES, JORDAN, MALAYSIA, SIN-
GAPORE  
Labor market   
Unemployed NEW ZEALAND, HUNGARY, LITHUANIA 
Unfilled job vacancies POLAND, CYPRUS 
Hours of work, manufacturing HUNGARY 
Sources: Ahmad (2003), Bersales et al. (2004), Demetriades (1999), Everhart and Duval-Hernandez (2000), Hoos et al. (1997), Mongardini 
and Saadi-Sedik (2003), Nilsson (2006), Nilsson and Brunet (2005), Nilsson and Guidetti (2007) and Zhang and Zhuang (2002). 
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Appendix 3. Candidate indicators for Ukraine 
 
 
Factor Desirable indicators Availability, proxies Formula Details Sources 
Variable 
name 
Ad-
jPPI=PPI/CPI
/IM 
AdjPPI 
 
Price in-
flexibility 
and dispro-
portions 
Adjusted 
PPI 
A ratio of producers’ price index 
(PPI) and consumers’ price index 
(CPI) divided on the index of metal 
prices (IM); reciprocal PPI RecPPI=1/PP
I 
PPI and CPI 
(12/2002=1); IM 
(2005=100) 
DerzhComStat and IMF 
RecPPI 
 
Business 
confidence 
and expecta-
tions 
Survey-
based in-
dexes 
Available on the quarterly basis 
only 
Not used    
Domestic 
demand 
Retail turn-
over 
Poor quality of data Not used in 
the final ver-
sion 
 DerzhComStat  
 Households 
incomes or 
expendi-
tures 
Poor quality of data Not used in 
the final ver-
sion 
 DerzhComStat  
Foreign trade Terms of 
trade 
Not available directly. We would 
like to substitute it with an index of 
the World prices on steel, but it is 
unavailable either. Instead, the 
IMF’s metal price index was used 
Not used in 
the final ver-
sion 
 IMF   
Exports Volume of 
exports 
Available   in mln USD 
(nominal) 
DerzhComStat, based on the 
information from customs 
Export 
 Trade bal-
ance 
Available  in mln USD 
(nominal) 
DerzhComStat, based on the 
information from customs 
TBal 
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Factor Desirable indicators Availability, proxies Formula Details Sources 
Variable 
name 
Financial 
markets 
Volume of 
loans 
Available  In bln UAH 
(nominal) 
Also real credit 
(Cred/CPI) was 
tried unsuccess-
fully 
NBU Credits 
  Interest rate 
on loans 
Available; in practice reciprocal 
was used  
Also real interest 
rate (Credit% 
/CPI) was tried 
unsuccessfully 
NBU Credit% 
 
 Bad loans Not available; poor quality of data 
even if available 
    
 Money ag-
gregate M2 
Available Not used in 
the final ver-
sion 
 NBU  
RXrate = 
0.7*Xrate(U
AH/USD) + 
0.3*Xrate(U
AH/EUR) 
 
RXrate Purchasing 
power of 
domestic 
currency 
Real effec-
tive ex-
change rate 
Available (in the version: effective 
exchange rate, and the one adjusted 
for CPI) 
REXrate=RX
rate/CPI 
Also real effective 
exchange rate in 
the version 
(EER/PPI) was 
tried unsuccess-
fully 
NBU 
REXrate 
 
Industrial production indexes for 
the EU (2000 = 100%)  
 Eurostat 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu 
EUoutput 
 
External 
markets 
GDP 
growth in 
the basket 
of main 
trade part-
ners 
and Russia 
(2005=100%) 
 
 
UNECE 
(http://w3.unece.org) 
RUSoutput
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Appendix 4. Examples of graphical analysis of selected candidate indicators 
 
 
Figures 1A-5A present monthly data for the period of Jan00-Dec07. In all cases the original series were detrended 
using the Hodric-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 14400, smoothed by the same filter with a pa-
rameter of 50, and then normalized by dividing by the standard deviation. In all cases Ukrainian industrial output 
served as the target variable. 
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Figure 1A. The EU industrial output index (used in the probit models) 
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Figure 2A. Exports, USD (used in the probit models) 
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Figure 3A. Reciprocal average interest rate on bank loans (used in the probit models) 
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Figure 4A. Real households expenditures (not used in the probit models) 
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Figure 5A. Retail turnover (nominal, in UAH) (not used in the probit models) 
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Appendix 5. Results of modeling experiments 
 
Sample: Jan00-Jun08 Sample: Jan03-Jun08 Sample: Jan00-Sep08   Model 1B Model 1C Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Lag Coeff z-Stat p-value Coeff z-Stat
p-
value Coeff z-Stat
p-
value Coeff z-Stat 
p-
value Coeff z-Stat
p-
value
Constant   0.447 1.359 0.174 -0.099 -0.304 0.761 -0.005 -0.023 0.981 -0.284 -1.265 0.206 -0.608 -1.885 0.059
AdjPPI -6 -1.967 -2.834 0.005 -1.145 -2.455 0.014                   
Credit% -3 1.906 2.021 0.043                         
Credit% -6             1.323 3.588 0.000 1.955 3.973 0.000       
Credit% -9 1.869 3.138 0.002 2.654 3.653 0.000                   
Credit% -18             0.640 2.355 0.019 1.218 3.559 0.000       
Credits -3                         1.799 3.978 0.000
Credits -9       -1.002 -2.132 0.033                   
EUoutput -3             0.953 3.364 0.001             
EUoutput -6 2.448 2.962 0.003             1.382 3.778 0.000 1.093 3.113 0.002
EUoutput -9 -0.832 -1.524 0.128 2.767 2.748 0.006                   
EUoutput -12                   -0.797 -2.785 0.005 -0.500 -2.144 0.032
Exports -3             0.392 1.810 0.070             
Exports -6 -1.011 -1.962 0.050                         
Exports -9 1.016 1.858 0.063       0.295 1.408 0.159             
REXrate -6 1.275 2.400 0.016                   0.694 2.906 0.004
REXrate -9       1.028 2.383 0.017                   
RUSoutput -12             -0.654 -2.668 0.008 -0.592 -2.367 0.018       
McFadden R-squared 0,679     0,577     0,499     0,517     0,567   
Obs with Dep=0  42    28    42    42    42   
Obs with Dep=1  51    38    45    45    51   
Total obs  93    66    87    87    93   
Correctly predicted values 84    57    71    73    80   
Prediction accuracy 90,3%     86,4%     81,6%     83,9%     86,0%   
 
